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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In these consolidated cases, the State appeals from the district court’s order granting Kyle
Anderson’s post-verdict Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) motions for judgment of acquittal.  Because
the State fails to show error in the district court ruling there was insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s verdicts finding Mr. Anderson guilty of possession of heroin, possession of
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia, this Court should affirm the district
court’s order.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State originally charged Kyle Anderson by information with felony counts of
possession of methamphetamine, possession of heroin, and possession of methadone; and by
citation with misdemeanor counts of possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.60-62, 211.)  The State later filed an information part II alleging
Mr. Anderson was a persistent violator.  (R., pp.79-81.)  The State dismissed the possession of
methadone and possession of marijuana charges, and a consolidated trial was held on the three
remaining charges.  (R., pp.106-112.)
Stephanie Barker and Jacob Bittick testified that they picked up Mr. Anderson from a
residence in Caldwell and brought him to Ms. Barker’s apartment in Payette, on February 17,
2016.  (Tr., p.30, L.4 – p.32, L.24, p.64, L.20 – p.67. L.8.)  The following day, Mr. Anderson’s
probation officer, Kraig Galloway, with the assistance of Payette Police officers, located
Mr. Anderson and ultimately searched Ms. Barker’s apartment.  (Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.9, L.22, p.81,
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L.19 – p.86, L.4; Ex.1, pp.11-12 (Defense Ex. A).)  When the officers arrived, Mr. Anderson was
in the kitchen along with a bag containing his personal possessions.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13, p.15,
L.22 – p.16, L.3.)  No contraband was found either on Mr. Anderson’s person or in his bag.
(Tr., p.16, L.22 – p.17, L.17.)  Mr. Anderson admitted to Officer Galloway that he had relapsed
on  heroin  the  previous  day,  and  Officer  Galloway  saw  track  marks  on  Mr.  Anderson’s  arm
consistent with using heroin intravenously.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-15, p.25, L.2 – p.27, L.25.)
Ms. Barker testified that she, Mr. Bittick, and Mr. Anderson all used drugs together, and
that she saw Mr. Anderson inject heroin and smoke methamphetamine through a glass pipe while
he was at her apartment.  (Tr., p.32, L.25 – p.36, L.10.)  She further testified that she and
Mr. Anderson attempted to hide drugs and paraphernalia in her bedroom, when the officers
arrived.  (Tr. p.41, L.18 – p.44, L.3.)  Mr. Bittick echoed Ms. Barker’s testimony claiming the
three used drugs together and that he saw Mr. Anderson inject heroin and smoke
methamphetamine while he was Ms. Barker’s apartment.  (Tr., p.66, L.24 – p.68, L.22.)
Although officers testified they found suspected drugs and paraphernalia in Ms. Barker’s
bedroom, the State introduced only three of those items during the trial:  a baggy containing a
small amount of a powdery substance, a browned cotton ball2, each of which were found in a
lockbox3 in the bedroom closet, and a pipe found between some clothes in the bedroom closet.
(Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.15, L.1, p.19, Ls.5-10, p.87, L.9 – p.98, L.13, p.104, Ls.20-25, p.123, L.18 –
p.130, L.6.)  The items were tested at the Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory revealing the
1 Citations to the electronic appellate file containing the exhibits will use the designation “Ex.”
2 A spoon with suspected heroin residue was also found in the lockbox but was not tested at the
State lab.  (Tr., p.87, Ls.9-14.)
3 Two safes were found in Ms. Barker’s bedroom – a floor safe near her nightstand, and another
smaller safe found in her closet.  (Tr., p.49, L.20 – p.50, L.4.)  The district court described the
small safe found in the closet as a “lockbox” for ease of reference.  (R., p.178.)
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baggy contained a small amount of methamphetamine, the cotton ball contained heroin, and the
pipe contained methamphetamine residue.  (Tr., p.131, L.2 – p.147, L.5; see also Ex., pp.3-10.)
Ms.  Barker  identified  the  pipe  found  in  her  closet  as  belonging  to  Mr.  Anderson.
(Tr., p.44, L.18 – p.45, L.7.)  The lockbox found in Ms. Barker’s closet belonged to her ex-
boyfriend, she did not have the key to it, and she did not know what was inside of it.  (Tr., p.49,
L.20 – p.51, L.1.)  Officer Toth testified that he had to use a screwdriver to open the lockbox.
(Tr., p.87, Ls.7-18.)
After the State rested, Mr. Anderson moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon the
fact that the State failed to present evidence corroborating Ms. Barker and Mr. Bittick’s
testimony.  (Tr., p.148, L.13 – p.150, L.3.)  The State conceded that Ms. Barker and Mr. Bittick
were accomplices to Mr. Anderson’s alleged crimes, but argued their allegations were
sufficiently  corroborated,  and  the  court  took  the  motion  under  advisement.   (Tr.,  p.150,  L.5  –
p.152, L.15.)  Mr. Anderson, however, withdrew his motion reserving his right to raise the issue
again if the jury found him guilty.  (Tr., p.157, Ls.9-21.)  The jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of
all three charges, and he admitted to being a persistent violator.  (R., p.146; Tr., p.161, L.12 –
p.162, L.11.)
Mr. Anderson filed a written motion for a judgment of acquittal on all three charges,
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c), and the State filed a written response.  (R., pp.162-172.)
The district court granted Mr. Anderson’s motion holding as follows:
The State makes the following five arguments regarding evidence to
corroborate the accomplice’s  testimony:   (1)  the  fact  that  Anderson  was  in  the
kitchen upon police arrival could be considered proof that Anderson knew there
were illegal items in the home since he was in the location in the home furthest
from the items; (2) the “track marks” on his arm corroborate the testimony that he
had injected illegal substances; (3) Anderson’s admission that he had used heroin
the day prior to the arrest corroborates the possession of heroin testimony; (4) the
heroin in the lockbox “could have been accessible to Defendant” even though it
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was inaccessible to police; and (5) the discovery of the glass meth pipe
corroborated Barker’s testimony that Anderson put it there immediately before
police entered the home.
Items  (1)  and  (4)  above  are  simply  arguments  as  to  what  the  jury  could
infer from the evidence presented at trial, not what evidence corroborates
accomplice testimony.  Items (2) and (3) above, related to Anderson’s admission
of heroin use and the “track marks” located on his  arm could potentially
corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding possession of heroin, except that
the heroin admitted at trial was recovered from a lockbox in Barker's closet that
had to be forced open because no one had a key to it.  Finally, item (5) above,
regarding  the  discovery  of  the  meth  pipe  in  the  closet,  does  not  corroborate
Barker’s testimony that Anderson put it there.  There is nothing about the
discovery of the meth pipe that links Anderson specifically to being in possession
of it.
Similar to State v. Dietrich,4 the only evidence linking Anderson to
possession  of  the  controlled  substances  and  possession  of  paraphernalia  was  the
testimony of Barker and Bittick claiming that Anderson brought the heroin to the
residence, injected heroin while at the residence, smoked meth, owned the meth
pipe, and stashed some of the illegal items in their bedroom. Because there is no
evidence to corroborate the testimony of Barker and Bittick linking Anderson to
the crimes, the evidence is insufficient to sustain Anderson’s convictions.
(R., pp.175-183.)  The State filed timely Notices of Appeal from the judgments of acquittal
entered in each case.  (R., pp.190-193, 230-237.)
4 See 135 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 2001).
5
ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Anderson’s motion for judgment of acquittal?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Anderson’s Motion For Judgment Of Acquittal
A. Introduction
A person may not be convicted of a crime absent sufficient evidence to support a finding,
by a reasonable trier of fact, that the State proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Uncorroborated testimony from an alleged accomplice will not support such a finding.
Because, as the State concedes, Mr. Anderson did not have access to the methamphetamine and
heroin found in the lockbox, and because the State presented insufficient evidence to corroborate
accomplice testimony claiming Mr. Anderson had possession of the pipe, the district court
correctly granted Mr. Anderson’s motion for judgment of acquittal on all three charges.
B. The State Failed To Present Legally Sufficient Evidence To Sustain The Jury’s Verdicts
“‘On  review  of  the  denial  of  a  motion  for  a  judgment  of  acquittal,  the  appellate  court
exercises free review of the record, taking all inferences in favor of the state, to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the challenged conviction.’” State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 644 (1998) (quoting State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 813–14 (Ct. App. 1993)).
Idaho appellate Courts “‘will not overturn a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict,
where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that
the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724 (2007) (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267 (2003)).  “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and we
do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id.
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1. The  State  Failed  To Present  Substantial  Evidence  That  Mr.  Anderson  Possessed
The Baggy Containing Methamphetamine Found In The Lockbox, As Alleged In
Count I
The State concedes it presented insufficient evidence to support a finding that
Mr. Anderson had access to the lockbox where the baggy containing methamphetamine was
found.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.15, fn.5.)  Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence
supporting the jury’s finding that Mr. Anderson had knowledge of and the power and intent to
control the methamphetamine he was convicted of possessing in Count I. See State v. Seitter,
127 Idaho 356, 360 (1995) (approving jury instruction defining “possession” as “a person has
possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or has
the power and intention to control it.”)  Therefore, the district court correctly entered a judgment
of acquittal for the possession of methamphetamine charge.5
5 In a footnote, the State suggests it presented “ample evidence that [Mr.] Anderson possessed
the pipe with methamphetamine found” in the bedroom closet.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4, fn.2.)  To
the extent the State suggests this Court should hold the residue found on the pipe was sufficient
to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the felony possession of methamphetamine charge, it
should  reject  that  contention  for  multiple  reasons.   First,  the  State  failed  to  provide  this  Court
with a transcript of either its opening or closing arguments; thus, the State failed to provide an
adequate record showing the jury’s verdict may have been based on this theory. See State v.
Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (“an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error.”)  Second, in
arguing against Mr. Anderson’s Rule 29 motion, the prosecuting attorney did not argue the
residue found in the pipe was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the possession of
methamphetamine charge; thus, the State failed to preserve such an argument for appeal.
(R., pp.167-172 (State’s written objection to Mr. Anderson’s I.C.R. 29 motion)); State v. Garcia-
Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).  Finally, the State fails to support such
a claim (if it is indeed raising such a claim) with argument and authority in its Appellant’s Brief.
(See generally, Appellant’s Brief.); Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at ___, 396 P.3d at 705.
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2. The  State  Failed  To Present  Substantial  Evidence  That  Mr.  Anderson  Possessed
The Cotton Ball Containing Heroin Found In The Lockbox As Alleged In Count
II
The State’s concession that it presented insufficient evidence that Mr. Anderson had
access to the lockbox is equally fatal to its claim that the district court erred in acquitting
Mr.  Anderson  in  Count  II.   Again,  the  fact  that  Mr.  Anderson  did  not  have  any  access  to  the
lockbox wherein the cotton ball that tested positive for heroin was found, demonstrates that there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Anderson had knowledge of the heroin’s
presence, and the power and intention to control it.  Therefore, the district court correctly entered
a judgment of acquittal for the possession of heroin charge.
3. The State Failed To Present Substantial Evidence Corroborating Ms. Barker’s
Testimony That Mr. Anderson Possessed The Meth Pipe
The meth pipe the State alleged Mr. Anderson possessed was found hidden in some
clothing in the bedroom closet, and there is no dispute that Mr. Anderson would have had
physical access to the pipe.  (Tr., p.104, Ls.20-25.)  However, the only evidence the State
presented that Mr. Anderson actually had knowledge of the pipe’s presence, and had the power
and  intention  to  control  it,  came  from  his  alleged  accomplice,  Ms.  Barker.   (Tr.,  p.44,  L.18  –
p.45, L.7.)
Under Idaho law,
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is
corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the
testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission
of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the
commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.
I.C. § 19-2117.  The Court of Appeals summarized the corroboration requirement as follows:
“This statutory corroboration requirement is intended to protect against the danger
that an accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an innocent
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defendant in order to win more favorable treatment for the accomplice.”
Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001).  The
corroborating evidence required by I.C. § 19–2117 need not “be sufficient to
sustain  a  conviction  on  its  own,  nor  must  it  corroborate  every  detail  of  the
accomplice's testimony.” State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 382, 195 P.3d 737,
741 (Ct. App. 2008).  The corroborating evidence may be slight, need only go to
one material fact, and may be entirely circumstantial. Id.  In addition, statements
attributable to the defendant may serve as the necessary corroboration. Id.  146
Idaho at 382–383, 195 P.3d at 741–742.  The corroborating evidence is sufficient
if it tends to connect the defendant to the crime independent of the accomplice’s
testimony. State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 364, 690 P.2d 293, 299 (1984).
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 891-892 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations original).
As the district court correctly found, “the only evidence linking [Mr.] Anderson to …
possession of paraphernalia was the testimony of Barker and Bittick claiming that Anderson …
smoked meth, owned the meth pipe, and stashed some of the illegal items in their bedroom.”
(R., p.181.)  Although Mr. Anderson admitted to relapsing on heroin, he did not admit to using
methamphetamine, and the track marks on his arm do not support the conclusion that he
possessed the meth pipe.  The district court correctly held the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence corroborating Ms. Barker’s claim that Mr. Anderson possessed the meth pipe.
Therefore, the district court correctly entered a judgment of acquittal for the possession of
methamphetamine charge.
C. The Timing Of Mr. Anderson’s Relapse, The Track Marks On His Arms, And His
Admission  To  Using  Heroin,  Do  Not  Corroborate  Ms.  Barker  And  Mr.  Bittick’s
Testimony
The State argues the timing of Mr. Anderson’s relapse, the track marks on his arms, and
his admitted “drug use,” corroborated Ms. Barker and Mr. Bittick’s testimony.  (Appellant’s
Brief pp.9-17.)  The State theorizes that Mr. Anderson’s admission to using heroin the day before
he was arrested, the track marks on his arms, and his lack of denial that he used
methamphetamine, all support a conclusion that he used both methamphetamine and heroin at
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Ms. Barker’s apartment.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-14.)  The State goes on to argue that there
was sufficient to “support his conviction for possessing heroin other than that found in the
lockbox” (Respondent’s Brief, p.15 (emphasis original)), and that Mr. Anderson’s “track marks
and admission of drug use are self-evidently significant, plainly bearing on the question of
whether he used and possessed drugs other than those found in the lockbox while he was there”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.17 (emphasis original)).  The State’s arguments are fundamentally
flawed.
Mr. Anderson was not charged with “us[ing] and possess[ing] drugs other than those
found in the lockbox” – he was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine, one
count of possession of heroin, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.60-62,
211.)  Naturally, a conviction for possession of methamphetamine requires proof that the
defendant possessed a substance that was actually methamphetamine; likewise, a conviction for
possession of heroin requires proof that the defendant possessed a substance that was actually
heroin.  (See e.g. R., pp.122-123 (elements instructions on possession of methamphetamine and
possession of heroin).)  Three items tested positive for controlled substances, two of which – the
baggy containing methamphetamine and the cotton ball containing heroin – were found in the
lockbox  the  State  concedes  Mr.  Anderson  did  not  have  access  to,  while  the  pipe  with
methamphetamine residue was found in the closet.  (Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.15, L.1, p.19, Ls.5-10,
p.87, L.9 – p.98, L.13, p.104, Ls.20-25, p.123, L.18 – p.130, L.6, p.131, L.2 – p.147, L.5; see
also Ex., pp.3-10.)  As the State presented no evidence that any other substances Mr. Anderson
may have had access to while in Ms. Barker’s apartment were either methamphetamine or
heroin, the State’s concession that Mr. Anderson had no access to the methamphetamine and
heroin found in the lockbox is dispositive, and the district court correctly held the State did not
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provide sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Anderson’s convictions for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of heroin.
As to the pipe, the State’s liberal view of the facts do not support its argument.
Mr. Anderson admitted he used heroin and he had track marks that support his admission.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.5-15, p.25, L.2 – p.27, L.25.)  The residue found on the pipe tested positive for
methamphetamine, not heroin, and smoking methamphetamine would not leave track marks on
Mr. Anderson’s arm.  Finally, the State’s characterization that Mr. Anderson did not deny using
methamphetamine at the time he was arrested, while perhaps relevant in a different case, is
specious in this case.  Officer Galloway did not confront Mr. Anderson with an accusation of
methamphetamine use; therefore, there was no allegation of methamphetamine use for
Mr. Anderson to deny.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.13-15 (“I asked him what his activities were.  He told me
he had been using heroin.”))  It is simply illogical to conclude that Mr. Anderson not denying an
accusation that was not made, corroborates the very accusation that was not made.
In sum, the State concedes that Mr. Anderson could not have possessed the
methamphetamine and heroin he was convicted of possessing, and the State presented no
evidence corroborating the claim that he possessed the methamphetamine pipe.  Thus, the State
has failed to show error in the district court’s order of judgment of acquittal on all three charges.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court’s order granting Mr. Anderson’s motion for
judgment of acquittal.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2017.
____________/s/_____________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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